A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for instance, the pain of losing $100 is felt more strongly than the joy of winning $200. The aim of this paper is to examine an influential argument that some have interpreted as showing that such moderate risk aversion is irrational. After presenting an axiomatic argument that I take to be the strongest case for the claim that moderate risk aversion is irrational, I show that it essentially depends on an assumption that those who think that risk aversion can be rational should be skeptical of. Hence, I conclude that risk aversion need not be irrational
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Reje...
The theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing margi...
Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decis...
A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200...
Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down some gambles with positive monet...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Reje...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in c...
According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained...
Risk aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper...
It is widely held that the influence of risk on rational decisions is not entirely explained by the ...
Abstract: In math class, expected value is often used when deciding whether or not a game is worth p...
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly res...
AbstractThe aim of this study was to investigate the irrationality in decision making on risk attitu...
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Reje...
The theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing margi...
Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decis...
A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200...
Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down some gambles with positive monet...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Reje...
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered ...
We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in c...
According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained...
Risk aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper...
It is widely held that the influence of risk on rational decisions is not entirely explained by the ...
Abstract: In math class, expected value is often used when deciding whether or not a game is worth p...
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly res...
AbstractThe aim of this study was to investigate the irrationality in decision making on risk attitu...
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and risk aversion. Reje...
The theory of expected utility maximization (EUM) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing margi...
Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decis...